UNEMPLOYED BUT OPTIMISTIC: OPTIMAL INSURANCE DESIGN WITH BIASED BELIEFS
研究发现失业者高估自己找到工作的速度，导致搜寻不足、储蓄过少。论文分析了偏误信念下最优失业政策的充分统计量公式，并重新审视了向失业者提供流动性的可取性，发现最优政策可能需要在失业期间增加福利。
This paper analyzes how biased beliefs about employment prospects affect the optimal design of unemployment insurance. Empirically, I find that the unemployed greatly overestimate how quickly they will find work. As a consequence, they would search too little for work, save too little for unemployment and deplete their savings too rapidly when unemployed. I analyze the use of the "sufficient-statistics" formula to characterize the optimal unemployment policy when beliefs are biased and revisit the desirability of providing liquidity to the unemployed. I also find that the optimal unemployment policy may involve increasing benefits during the unemployment spell.