Financial Fragility and Economic Performance
通过理论模型探讨金融稳定与经济表现的关系，认为企业家净财富低导致外部融资依赖高、代理成本上升，进而造成投资低效，而应对金融脆弱的政策可视为维持借款人净财富的转移支付。
Financial stability is an important goal of policy, but the relation of financial stability to economic performance and even the meaning of the term itself are poorly understood. This paper explores these issues in a theoretical model. We argue that financial instability, or fragility, occurs when entrepreneurs who want to undertake investment projects have low net worth; the heavy reliance on external finance that this implies causes the agency costs of investment to be high. High agency costs in turn lead to low and inefficient investment. Standard policies for fighting financial fragility can be interpreted as transfers that maintain or increase the net worth of potential borrowers.