Credibility and Flexibility with Independent Monetary Policy Committees
研究独立货币政策委员会如何在保持低通胀的同时不牺牲政策灵活性。委员会成员在冲击较小时更倾向于低通胀和建立声誉，而大冲击时反应激励超过声誉收益，从而提升社会福利。
Abstract: Independent monetary policy committees are a simple way of attaining relatively low inflation without completely sacrificing an activist role for monetary policy. If central bankers ’ types are unknown, then for a wide range of parameters an independent committee achieves higher social welfare than either a zero-inflation rule or discretionary policy conducted by an opportunistic central banker. A key reason for the committee’s superior performance is that committee members are relatively likely to opt for low inflation and building a reputation when shocks are small. When large shocks hit the economy, the incentive to react outweighs the reputation-building benefit.