Network Competition in Nonlinear Pricing
研究电信运营商在非线性定价下的竞争，发现当用户需求无弹性时利润与接入费无关；有弹性时运营商可能通过低于成本的接入费合谋，而高于成本的接入费通常提升社会福利。
Previous research, assuming linear pricing, has argued that telecommunications networks may use a high access charge as an instrument of collusion. I show that this conclusion is difficult to maintain when operators compete in nonlinear pricing: (i) As long as subscription demand is inelastic, profits can remain independent of the access charge, even when customers are heterogeneous and networks engage in second-degree price discrimination. (ii) When demand for subscriptions is elastic, networks may increase profits by agreeing on an access charge below marginal cost (relative to cost-based access pricing). Welfare is typically increased by setting the access charge above marginal cost.