Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender
通过实验室实验，研究不同绩效薪酬方案（计件、锦标赛、收益分享）如何影响工人的自我选择，发现生产力分类是产出差异的主因，且不同方案吸引不同态度和性别的个体。
This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory experiment. Subjects face the choice between a fixed and a variable payment scheme. Depending on the treatment, the variable payment is a piece rate, a tournament, or a revenue-sharing scheme. We find that output is higher in the variable-payment schemes compared to the fixed-payment scheme. This difference is largely driven by productivity sorting. In addition, different incentive schemes systematically attract individuals with different attitudes, such as willingness to take risks and relative self-assessment as well as gender, which underlines the importance of multidimensional sorting.