社会偏好博弈的外部有效性:一项系统的实验室-实地研究

On the External Validity of Social Preference Games: A Systematic Lab-Field Study

Management Science · 2018
被引 246 · 同刊同年前 5%
人大 A+FT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

通过比较同一批参与者在多种实验博弈中的行为与实地行为及过去自报行为,发现社会偏好博弈对解释实地和过去的社会行为效果不佳,并包含系统综述和元分析。

Abstract

We present a lab-field experiment designed to systematically assess the external validity of social preferences elicited in a variety of experimental games. We do this by comparing behavior in the different games with several behaviors elicited in the field and with self-reported behaviors exhibited in the past, using the same sample of participants. Our results show that the experimental social preference games do a poor job explaining both social behaviors in the field and social behaviors from the past. We also include a systematic review and meta-analysis of previous literature on the external validity of social preference games. Data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2908 . This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.

社会偏好博弈外部有效性实验室-实地实验行为经济学