ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION TO DIVERSIFY CONTRACTUAL RISK*
研究了经理人通过金融投资组合分散薪酬风险对合同效率的影响，发现与企业特定风险相关的投资组合能改善合同效率，且当信息成本相同时，由企业代为对冲更优。
Are hedging transactions that diversify a manager’s compensation risk detrimental to incentives, or can they improve contracting efficiency? If hedging provides efficiency benefits, should the manager or the firm undertake it? In our model, both the firm and the manager can trade financial portfolios to diversify the manager’s compensation risk. Prior to the portfolio selection, the parties need to acquire information on how different financial portfolios fit their diversification purposes. We illustrate that financial portfolios correlated with firm‐specific risk improve contracting efficiency. For equal information costs, it is optimal for the firm to undertake the hedging on the manager’s behalf.