The complexity of compensation contracts
通过考察股东授权的薪酬安排，发现股票期权和限制性股票计划的条款以及董事会的谈判灵活性随管理资产特征系统变化，挑战了将薪酬简单分为绩效敏感或非敏感的传统观点。
Management compensation is often categorized as either sensitive or insensitive to firm performance. This one-dimensional treatment ignores the variation in the types and terms of compensation contracts. Through a cross-sectional examination of share-holder-authorized compensation arrangements, this paper demonstrates that the terms of stock option and restricted stock plans, and the flexibility afforded the board of directions in negotiating with managers, vary systematically with the characteristics of the assets being managed. This variation in compensation contracting challenges theorists to incorporate the richness of management contracts into models of incentive pay.