Sequential Sales, Learning, and Cascades
研究IPO股票序贯销售时，后投资者如何从先投资者购买决策中学习，导致信息级联，并预测发行成败迅速、风险中性发行人可能折价发行以避免失败等结果。
ABSTRACT When IPO shares are sold sequentially, later potential investors can learn from the purchasing decisions of earlier investors. This can lead rapidly to “cascades” in which subsequent investors optimally ignore their private information and imitate earlier investors. Although rationing in this situation gives rise to a winner's curse, it is irrelevant. The model predicts that: (1) Offerings succeed or fail rapidly. (2) Demand can be so elastic that even risk‐neutral issuers underprice to completely avoid failure. (3) Issuers with good inside information can price their shares so high that they sometimes fail. (4) An underwriter may want to reduce the communication among investors by spreading the selling effort over a more segmented market.