The Impact of Manufacturers' Wholesale Prices on a Retailer's Shelf‐Space and Pricing Decisions*
研究两个竞争品牌制造商与一个零售商之间的博弈，分析批发价格如何影响零售商的货架空间分配和定价决策，发现品牌批发价格与其货架份额密切相关。
ABSTRACT This article examines shelf‐space allocation and pricing decisions in the marketing channel as the results of a static game played à la Stackelberg between two manufacturers of competing brands and one retailer. The competing manufacturers act as leaders that play a simultaneous and noncooperative game. They fix their transfer prices by taking into account the shelf‐space allocation and price‐markup decisions of their common exclusive dealer. The results indicate that the wholesale prices of brands are strongly linked to their share of the shelf. The main results of our numerical simulations may be summarized as follows: first, the lower the unit cost and/or the greater the price elasticity, the greater the shelf space allocated to that brand. Second, the higher the shelf‐space elasticity, the lower are the wholesale prices and the profits of all channel members.