Distributional Effects in Household Models: Separate Spheres and Income Pooling
研究非合作家庭模型中夫妻对公共物品的自愿贡献，发现双方要么贡献于不同公共物品（独立领域），要么最多贡献于一个共同物品（局部收入汇集），且收入分配决定家庭处于哪种状态，对定向福利政策效果有启示。
We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public goods or they contribute to at most one common good. The former case corresponds to the separate spheres case of Lundberg and Pollak (1993) . The second outcome yields (local) income pooling. A household will be in different regimes depending on the distribution of income within the household. Any bargaining model with this non-cooperative case as a breakdown point will inherit the local income pooling. We conclude that targeting benefits such as child benefits to one household member may not always have an effect on outcomes. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.