THE ADOPTION OF STATE ELECTRICITY REGULATION: THE ROLE OF INTEREST GROUPS*
研究了20世纪初美国各州采纳电力监管的影响因素，发现产能短缺、财富水平高和居民电力普及率低会促进采纳，工业和煤矿业发达的州采纳率更高，支持利益集团和契约理论。
This paper examines the adoption of state electricity regulation around the beginning of the 20th century. I model this decision as a hazard rate to determine what influenced the adoption of state regulation. I find that adoption is positively correlated with capacity shortages, greater wealth and lower residential electricity penetration rates. These results suggest that state regulation responded to regulatory inefficiencies and residential consumer interests. In addition, adoption rates were higher in states that had a strong industrial and coal mining presence. These results are consistent with the interest group and contracting theories of regulation.