Verifiable Offers and the Relationship Between Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations
通过实验比较第二价格拍卖与可验证多边谈判，发现后者价格更低，因为低成本卖家常报出低于次低成本的初始报价。
We use the experimental method to compare second-price auctions with 'verifiable' multilateral negotiations in which the sole buyer can credibly reveal to sellers the best price offer he currently holds. Despite the two institutions' seeming equivalence, we find that prices are lower in verifiable multilateral negotiations than in second-price auctions. The difference occurs because low-cost sellers in negotiations often submit initial offers below the second-lowest cost. We also compare the two institutions to previously studied first-price auctions and multilateral negotiations with non-verifiable offers. Second-price auctions yield the highest prices, followed in order by verifiable negotiations, non-verifiable negotiations and first-price auctions. Copyright 2005 Royal Economic Society.