Incentives, wages, and promotions: theory and evidence
研究大型组织中重复性人力资本投资的激励问题，提出一个简单的最优合同，并用美国一家保险公司健康保险理赔处理员的员工数据验证了该合同的主要特征。
I study an incentive problem that has been largely ignored in the agency literature: incentives for repeated (human capital) investment. The optimal contract is very simple but still provides rich implications for incentive and wage structures in large organizations. The empirical evidence is presented using personnel records of health insurance claim processors in a large U.S. insurance company. These processors are white‐collar, nonmanagerial, female, service industry workers—a rapidly growing but rarely studied labor group. The empirical findings are consistent with the main features of the optimal contract .