JUMPING THE CURSE: EARLY CONTRACTING WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION IN UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS*
提出一个早期签约模型，雇主因担心录取者是被其他机构拒绝的而提前签约，并用大学招生数据验证该模型与多个典型事实一致，发现早期签约反而可能提高资源配置效率。
This article introduces a new model of early contracting. Employers who have private information about the applicant's ability worry that applicants who accept their offer are precisely those who were not offered other jobs. To avoid this winner's curse, employers anticipate the time of contracting. The model is developed in the context of university admissions, and is shown to be consistent with several stylized facts in that “market.” We show that, in contrast to received wisdom, allocative efficiency may be improved by the presence of early contracting.