Experimental Auction Procedure: Impact on Valuation of Quality Differentiated Goods
比较了不同实验拍卖程序（如第二价格拍卖、英式拍卖、BDM和随机第n价格拍卖）对质量差异化商品估值的影响，发现程序选择显著影响估值结果，尤其在后几轮拍卖中。
Despite increased use of experimental auctions, a myriad of different procedures are being employed without formal consideration of how the procedures might affect results. This study investigates the effect of several procedural issues on valuation estimates from experimental auctions. Results indicate the second price auction generates higher valuations than English, Becker—DeGroot—Marschak (BDM), and random n th price auctions, especially in latter bidding rounds, and that random n th price auction yields lower valuations than English and BDM auctions. We find that endowing subjects with a good prior to eliciting bids can have an impact on valuations, but the effect varies across auction mechanism.