Coordination in Split Award Auctions
分析拆分授予采购拍卖中，买方将全部生产分配给两个供应商或一个供应商，供应商有私人成本信息时，均衡出价如何隐含协调，并比较拆分授予与赢家通吃拍卖的优劣。
We analyze split award procurement auctions in which a buyer divides full production between two suppliers or awards all production to a single supplier, and suppliers have private cost information. An intriguing feature of split awards is that the equilibrium bids are implicitly coordinated. Because a split award price is the sum of offered split prices, each supplier can unilaterally veto a split award by bidding very high for the split. The need to coordinate is reflected in a split price that does not vary with private information. We also explore conditions under which split award auctions may be preferred to winner-take-all auctions.