Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Private Values with Transferable Utility
研究了知情委托人在独立私人价值且可货币转移环境下的机制设计问题，发现委托人所有类型都会实施事前最优配置，无信号扭曲。
We provide a solution to the informed-principal problem in the independent private values setting with monetary transfers. The principal's private information creates signaling considerations that may distort the implemented allocation. We show that there is no distortion: all principal types implement an allocation that is optimal for the principal ex ante, before he/she learns his/her type. As an application, we consider settings with linear utility. For bilateral exchange in which the principal is one of the traders, the solution is a combination of a participation fee, a buy-out option for the principal, and a resale stage with posted prices.