Competing for Ownership
构建了一个模型，分析竞争市场中所有权与控制权的配置，揭示资产稀缺如何转化为内部所有权结构，并说明流动性或生产率冲击如何引发广泛的组织重组。
We develop a tractable model of the allocation of ownership and control within firms operating in competitive markets. The model permits analysis of how the scarcity of assets in the market translates into ownership structures inside the organization. It identifies a price-like mechanism whereby local liquidity or productivity shocks propagate and lead to widespread organizational restructuring. Firms will be more integrated when the terms of trade are more favorable to the short side of the market, when liquidity is unequally distributed among existing firms, and following a uniform increase in productivity. Shocks to the first two moments of the liquidity distribution have multiplier effects on the corresponding moments of the distribution of ownership structures.