Corporate Financing: An Artificial Agent‐based Analysis
通过模拟适应性主体学习证券收益和价格的过程，发现即使在完美市场中，融资顺序仍存在，普通债务优于其他选择，而股权和可转换债券被低估。
Abstract We examine corporate security choice by simulating an economy populated by adaptive agents who learn about the structure of security returns and prices through experience. Through a process of evolutionary selection, each agent gravitates toward strategies that generate the highest payoffs. Despite the fact that markets are perfect and agents maximize value, a financing hierarchy emerges in which straight debt dominates other financing choices. Equity and convertible debt display significant underpricing. In general, the smaller the probability of loss to outside investors, the more likely the firm is to issue the security and the smaller the security's underpricing.