Contractual Incompleteness, Unemployment, and Labour Market Segmentation
通过模型和实验证明，合同不完全性（工作努力无法被第三方验证）会导致非自愿失业和劳动力市场分割（好工作与坏工作并存），为理解这两个现象提供了统一解释。
This article provides evidence that involuntary unemployment, and the segmentation of labour markets into firms offering "good" and "bad" jobs, may both arise as a consequence of contractual incompleteness. We provide a simple model that illustrates how unemployment and market segmentation may jointly emerge as part of a market equilibrium in environments where work effort is not third-party verifiable. Using experimental labour markets that differ only in the verifiability of effort, we demonstrate empirically that contractual incompleteness can cause unemployment and segmentation. Our data are also consistent with the key channels through which the model explains the emergence of both phenomena. Copyright 2014, Oxford University Press.