The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Earnings Management, and Post-Buyback Performance of Open-Market Repurchasing Firms
研究了萨班斯-奥克斯利法案如何影响公司回购前的盈余管理行为，以及这种影响与回购后业绩的关系，发现法案实施后公司不再通过应计项目向下操纵盈余，且回购后业绩与盈余管理的负相关关系消失。
Abstract We examine how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) affects pre-repurchase earnings management and its association with post-repurchase firm performance. Unlike prior pre-SOX studies, our post-SOX results indicate that open-market repurchasers do not engage in pre-buyback downward accrual-based earnings management. Audit committee independence, reforms in corporate governance structures, and changes in executives’ equity holdings prompted by SOX may explain the findings. Post-SOX, the significant negative association between pre-repurchase abnormal accruals and post-repurchase performance disappears, the market reaction to repurchase announcements becomes significantly less favorable, and there is no evidence of any shift away from accrual-based to real earnings management.