On the Design of Leniency Programs
研究了宽大处理方案在破坏合谋与可能被滥用之间的权衡，发现调查前提供宽大总是有益的，调查中提供宽大仅在调查成功率低时最优，并支持仅对首个举报者提供宽大。
Leniency programs contribute to destabilizing collusion but can also be abused and generate perverse effects. This paper develops a simple model capturing this trade-off, which we use to relate the optimal leniency policy (the carrot) to the effectiveness of investigations (the stick). We show that it is always desirable to offer some leniency before an investigation is launched; it is also optimal to offer some leniency once an investigation is underway when investigations are unlikely to succeed in uncovering cartels, absent self-reporting. Our analysis also confirms the usefulness of restricting leniency to the first informant only; in contrast, it does not support prohibiting leniency for repeat offenders.