Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936–2005
利用1936至2005年美国大公司高管薪酬数据，发现1940年代末至1970年代薪酬中位数平稳，与公司增长关联弱；近30年关联增强，且薪酬常能激励经理与股东利益一致，挑战了1980年代以来薪酬上涨的常见解释。
We analyze the long-run trends in executive compensation using a new dataset of top officers of large firms from 1936 to 2005. The median real value of compensation was remarkably flat from the late 1940s to the 1970s, revealing a weak relationship between pay and aggregate firm growth. By contrast, this correlation was much stronger in the past thirty years. This historical perspective also suggests that compensation arrangements have often helped to align managerial incentives with those of shareholders because executive wealth was sensitive to firm performance for most of our sample. These new facts pose a challenge to several common explanations for the rise in executive pay since the 1980s. Published by Oxford University Press 2010, Oxford University Press.