On the Political Economy of Income Redistribution and Crime
构建一般均衡模型，分析个体选择合法或犯罪活动，并通过多数投票内生决定警察支出和收入再分配，探讨不平等与犯罪的正相关、警察支出与再分配的正相关，以及犯罪与再分配无相关等美国数据现象。
This article analyzes a general equilibrium model in which agents choose to specialize in either legitimate or criminal activities. Expenditures on police to apprehend criminals, as well as income redistribution, are determined endogenously through majority voting. We investigate how crime, redistribution, and police expenditures depend on characteristics of the underlying distribution of income‐earning abilities and on the apprehension technology. Our model accounts for the positive correlation between inequality and crime, the positive correlation between expenditures on police and redistribution, and the lack of correlation between crime and redistribution observed in U.S. data.