INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND COMPETITION IN COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS*
研究了两个互联网络在同时收取去话和来话费用时，信息交换的均衡模型，发现去话和来话互补时网络减少离网价格歧视，允许协商接入费可消除连接中断，并识别出私人协商实现最优零售价格的条件。
We develop a model of information exchange between calling parties. We characterize the equilibrium when two interconnected networks compete by charging both for outgoing and incoming calls. We show that networks have reduced incentives to use off‐net price discrimination to induce a connectivity breakdown when calls originated and received are complements in the information exchange. This breakdown disappears if operators are allowed to negotiate reciprocal access charges. We also study the relationship between sending and receiving retail charges as a function of the level of access charges. We identify circumstances where private negotiations over access charges induce first‐best retail prices.