Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
刻画了在无货币的分配问题中，满足群体策略证明、帕累托最优和再分配证明的分配规则集合，这些规则模仿了基于层级禀赋的交易过程，并推广了Gale的顶级交易循环程序。
We give a characterization of the set of group-strategyproof, Pareto-optimal, and reallocation-proof allocation rules for the assignment problem, where individuals are assigned at most one indivisible object, without any medium of exchange. Although there are no property rights in the model, the rules satisfying the above criteria imitate a trading procedure with individual endowments, in which individuals exchange objects from their hierarchically determined endowment sets in an iterative manner. In particular, these assignment rules generalize Gale's top trading cycle procedure, the classical rule for the model in which each individual owns an indivisible good.