Voluntary Choices in Concerted Deals: The Menu Approach to Debt Reduction in Developing Countries
研究了发展中国家债务削减协议中，通过提供退出和再贷款选项的菜单方法，实现分散均衡并防止搭便车，分析了银行异质性对菜单优于简单回购的影响。
This article examines the mechanics and attributes of concerted debt reduction agreements that offer creditors a choice between exit and relending options. The menu approach sets prices for different choices that implement a decentralized equilibrium. When banks can commit to choose from the menu and are not allowed to free ride, a menu can be designed that assures that the price paid for debt repurchased is equal to the marginal value of the debt claims. This can be achieved by taxing the gains that accrue to nonexiters with a request for new money. The equilibrium amount of debt reduction rises when the new money request is increased. The importance of banks' heterogeneity for menus to dominate simple concerted buybacks and the case in which debt reduction can be financed by loans from international financial institutions are discussed. Copyright 1992 by Oxford University Press.