A Limited Rationality Model of Interlocking Directorates.
审视了关于连锁董事的冲突模型，提出有限理性模型作为更完整准确的替代方案，从董事、组织和社会三个视角解释连锁董事的存在原因、影响并预测其未来使用。
Conflicting models of interlocking directorates are examined, and a limited ratinality model is proposed as a more complete and accurate alternative. This model considers the costs, benefits, and limitations to optimal decision making concerning the creation of interlocking directorates from the viewpoints of (1) the participating directors, (2) the interlocking organizations, and (3) society. This framework is used to explain why interlocking directorates exist, to determine the net impact interlocks have on various constituencies, and to make predictions concerning their future use.