Trade Agreements and Enforcement: Evidence from WTO Dispute Settlement
基于贸易条件理论，研究WTO争端解决中贸易争端谈判的结果决定因素，发现争端谈判同样旨在解决贸易条件外部性问题，并通过1995-2009年WTO争端数据验证了理论预测。
This paper examines implications of the terms-of-trade theory for the determinants of outcomes arising under the enforcement provisions of international agreements. Like original trade agreement negotiations, formal trade dispute negotiations are modeled as potentially addressing the terms-of-trade externality problem that governments implement import protection above the globally efficient level so as to shift some of the policy's costs onto trading partners. The approach first extends the Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2011) model from trade agreement accession negotiations to the setting of enforcement negotiations, and the resulting theory guides the empirical assessment on trade volume outcomes from WTO disputes over 1995–2009.