Relative CEO Underpayment and CEO Behaviour Towards R&D Spending
研究CEO薪酬低于市场水平如何影响其削减研发支出的决策，发现低研发密集型行业中薪酬不足导致研发削减，高研发密集型行业则相反，且经理控制型企业中削减更明显。
abstract Arguments based on labour market theory suggest that there may be CEO behavioural issues related to pay deviations from the labour market rate for CEO pay; however, few studies examine this phenomenon. This study attempts to address such behavioural issues by examining the influence of relative CEO underpayment on reductions in R&D spending, the differences in this relationship between firms in high R&D intensive versus low R&D intensive industries, and the moderating affect of ownership structure on the CEO underpayment and R&D spending relationship. Results suggest that relative CEO underpayment is associated with reductions in R&D spending in low R&D intensive industries and increases in R&D spending in high R&D intensive industries. Also, greater relative CEO underpayment leads to greater reductions in R&D spending in manager‐controlled organizations as compared to owner‐controlled organizations. This study provides evidence that pay deviations may, in fact, affect certain CEO behaviours, specifically relating to innovation.