Competence Implies Credibility
证明，中央银行执行政策的能力（以私人信号精度衡量）越高，其相机抉择下的货币政策就越可信和透明，因为公众预期有能力央行更追求目标而非制造意外。
The (reputation for) competence of a central bank at doing its job makes monetary policy under discretion credible and transparent. Based on its reading of the state of the economy, the central bank announces its policy intentions to the public in a cheap-talk game. The precision of its private signal measures its competence. The fineness of the equilibrium message space measures its credibility and transparency. This is increasing in the competence/inflation bias ratio: the public expects a competent central bank to use its discretion more to pursue its “objective” targets than to surprise expectations and stimulate output.