Precision in Accounting Information, Financial Leverage and the Value of Equity
用一个考虑会计信息不完全的股权估值模型，分析财务杠杆如何影响企业选择会计信息精度。发现业绩中上等的企业会提高精度，而业绩差的企业会降低精度以避免债务违约和偏差被发现。
Abstract: Using an equity valuation model characterized by periodic imperfect accounting information, we examine how financial leverage affects a firm's accounting quality choice (i.e., precision). We find that the existence of financial leverage motivates firms with average to good performance to prepare accounting information with a high degree of precision. However, we conclude that when a firm is performing poorly it has an incentive to reduce accounting precision in order to lower the likelihood of both a debt covenant violation and the detection of accounting bias.