Intergroup Conflict and Intra-Group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game
研究竞赛游戏中群体间冲突如何受群体成员间惩罚的影响，发现群体冲突支出高于个人，且允许惩罚会进一步增加冲突支出，与公共品实验中惩罚提高效率的结果相反。
We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of sociopolitical conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available. We find, first, that conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are above equilibrium. Second, allowing group members to punish each other leads to even larger conflict expenditures. These results contrast with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency.