Under-contribution to generic advertising due to self-interested inequity aversion
研究了生产者因自利性不公平厌恶而不愿资助通用水果和蔬菜广告的现象，发现回报差异大会降低投票通过概率，而信息不完全、试运行、回报均等或政府支持则提高通过率。
We modify the behavioural postulate of self-centred inequity aversion to explain producers' reluctance to fund generic fruit and vegetable advertising as a result of experiencing negative utility when others benefit more from a public good than themselves, but positive utility when they earn more than others. We find that higher variability in returns decreases the probability of a favourable vote. Conversely, if information about payoffs is incomplete, if subjects are allowed to experience a trial run of a generic advertising programme, if returns are equal across producers, or if there is government support for the programme, the likelihood of approval rises.