Efficiency, Equality, and Labeling: An Experimental Investigation of Focal Points in Explicit Bargaining
通过实验研究谈判中与收益无关的空间标签如何影响结果，发现玩家倾向于达成高效且最小不平等的分配，但标签在多个类似方案中起选择作用。
We investigate Schelling's hypothesis that payoff-irrelevant labels (“cues”) can influence the outcomes of bargaining games with communication. In our experimental games, players negotiate over the division of a surplus by claiming valuable objects that have payoff-irrelevant spatial locations. Negotiation occurs in continuous time, constrained by a deadline. In some games, spatial cues are opposed to principles of equality or efficiency. We find a strong tendency for players to agree on efficient and minimally unequal payoff divisions, even if spatial cues suggest otherwise. But if there are two such divisions, cues are often used to select between them, inducing distributional effects.