Director Interlocks and Spillover Effects of Reputational Penalties From Financial Reporting Fraud
研究了美国财务报告欺诈事件中，通过董事连锁关联的企业如何受到声誉惩罚的溢出影响，发现约18.4%的关联企业遭受显著声誉损失，且当连锁董事担任审计或治理委员会主席时风险更高。
I examined the spillover of reputational penalties between firms in the context of financial reporting fraud. Drawing from signaling and attribution theories, I used financial event study methodology and found significant reputational penalties in 45 (18.4%) out of 244 firms with director interlocks to 30 firms accused of financial reporting fraud in the United States. Furthermore, logistic regression analysis suggested that firms thus associated with accused firms were more likely to experience significant reputational penalties when the interlocking directors held audit or governance chair positions in them. This likelihood decreased when these firms' observable governance structures signaled effective corporate governance.