Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
研究将策略无偏性弱化为序数贝叶斯激励相容后的策略投票问题，发现均匀先验下存在大量OBIC的社会选择函数，但独立信念的一般先验下只有独裁函数满足OBIC，凸显了吉巴德-萨特斯韦特定理的稳健性。
We study strategic voting after weakening the notion of strategy-proofness to Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (OBIC). Under OBIC, truth-telling is required to maximize the expected utility of every voter, expected utility being computed with respect to the voter's prior beliefs and under the assumption that everybody else is also telling the truth. We show that for a special type of priors, i.e., the uniform priors, there exists a large class of social choice functions that are OBIC. However, for priors that are generic in the set of independent beliefs, a social choice function is OBIC only if it is dictatorial. This result underlines the robustness of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. Copyright The Econometric Society 2004.