Moral Hazard and Information Sharing: A Model of Financial Information Gathering Agencies
提出一个理论模型，解释在信息不对称和道德风险下，金融信息收集机构（筛选机构群体）如何通过分散风险和共享信息来证明企业真实价值，对研究金融中介和信息市场的学者有参考价值。
ABSTRACT We propose a theory of information gathering agencies in a world of informational asymmetries and moral hazard. In a setting in which true firm values are certified by screening agents whose payoffs depend on noisy ex post monitors of information quality, the formation of information gathering agencies (groups of screening agents) is justified on two grounds. First, it enables screening agents to diversify their risky payoffs. Second, it allows information sharing. The first effect itself is insufficient despite the risk aversion of screening agents and the stochastic independence of the monitors used to compensate them.