Contestability and Pay Differential in the Executive Suites
利用367家以色列上市公司数据，检验高管团队内部薪酬差距的几种解释，发现不支持锦标赛和公平理论，而支持团队合作模型；在所有者管理的子样本中，薪酬差距更大且与绩效正相关。
In comparison to the abundant evidence on CEOs' compensations, little is known about the compensation of other senior executives, and on how the pay differential between CEO and other senior executives affects firm performance. We examine several potential explanations of the pay differential in the executive suite, using a sample of 367 Israeli firms listed on the Tel‐Aviv Stock Exchange. The empirical results fail to support the tournament and pay equity models. Instead, our evidence suggests a model where senior executives are encouraged (by the structure implied in their pay contract) to cooperate with each other (the team playing model). In a subset of firms managed by their owners we observe greater pay differentials between the owner‐CEO and other senior executives. Interestingly, only in this subset of owner‐managed firms, higher pay differentials can be associated with better firm performance.