Heterogeneous Agents in Public Goods Experiments
通过实验方法研究公共品博弈中至少三类玩家（搭便车者、合作者、互惠者）的异质性，发现将同类型玩家分组后平均贡献水平提高，且纯搭便车组贡献衰减，而合作与互惠组贡献高且稳定。
Abstract We explore by purely experimental means a heterogeneous agents scenario in experimental public goods games, assuming the existence of at least three types of player: free riders, cooperators, and reciprocators. We identify the various types by means of four classification methods, and then play the public goods game with homogeneous groups. We observe that (1) the average contribution level is enhanced in this setting; (2) the decay phenomenon is replicated in groups of ‘pure’ free riders, whereas in groups of cooperative and reciprocating players the contribution is high and fairly stable throughout the game.