Loss Leading as an Exploitative Practice
研究大型零售商如何通过亏本销售部分商品来区分多店购物者和单店购物者，从而行使市场势力，并发现禁止低于成本定价能提高消费者剩余、竞争对手利润和社会福利。
We show that large retailers, competing with smaller stores that carry a narrower range, can exercise market power by pricing below cost some of the products also offered by the smaller rivals, in order to discriminate multistop shoppers from one-stop shoppers. Loss leading thus appears as an exploitative device rather than as an exclusionary instrument, although it hurts the smaller rivals as well; banning below-cost pricing increases consumer surplus, rivals' profits, and social welfare. Our insights extend to industries where established firms compete with entrants offering fewer products. They also apply to complementary products such as platforms and applications.