Experimental internet auctions with random information retrieval
通过实验让97名被试在拍卖前检索历史记录，发现检索努力与收益正相关，且被试倾向于模仿样本中获胜者的平均出价比例，采用直觉性的停止规则。
Abstract We run an experiment where 97 subjects could retrieve records of completed past auctions before placing their bids in current one-bid, two-bid, and auction-selection games. Each subject was asked to participate in 3 current auctions; but could retrieve up to 60 records of completed (past) auctions. The results reveal a positive relation between the payoffs earned by the subjects and their history-inspection effort. Subjects act as if responding to the average bidding-ratios of the winners in the samples that they have retrieved. They apply intuitive signal-dependent stopping rules like “ sample until observing a winner-value close to my won” or “ find a close winner-value and try one more history” when sampling the databases. History-inspection directs bidders with relatively high private-valuations to moderate bidding which increases their realized payoffs.