How to Design Franchise Contracts: The Role of Contractual Hazards and Experience
研究了影响特许经营合同完整性的因素，发现经验丰富的特许人制定更完整的合同，且合同风险的影响并非总是正向直接，正式治理与关系治理之间存在替代效应。
This paper analyzes factors determining contractual completeness in franchising. We argue that completeness is affected by firms' contract design capabilities along with different contractual hazards. Our results support these hypotheses by showing that experienced franchisors draw up more complete contracts. Additionally, we observe that the effects of contractual hazards on completeness are not always positive and direct. There may be also a substitution effect between formal and relational governance mechanisms because risks of bilateral expropriations might serve as a mutual guarantee. This interaction also suggests that contract analysis must not only focus on particular clauses but also on the contract as a whole.