Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective
认为19世纪西方扩大选举权是政治精英为预防社会动荡和革命而做出的战略决策，通过改变未来政治均衡来承诺再分配，并解释了这一时期库兹涅茨曲线的下降。
During the nineteenth century most Western societies extended voting rights, a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs. We argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution. Political transition, rather than redistribution under existing political institutions, occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers, while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution. Our theory also offers a novel explanation for the Kuznets curve in many Western economies during this period, with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization.