Divisible Good Auctions with Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Examination
通过实验比较统一价格拍卖和歧视性拍卖在共同价值不完全信息下的竞价行为与收入，发现信息不对称时歧视性拍卖平均收入更高，且统一价格拍卖收入波动更大。
Abstract An experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when there is incomplete information concerning the common value of the auctioned good. In a symmetric information environment, the different auction formats provide the same average revenue. However, when information is asymmetric the discriminatory auction results in higher average revenue than the uniform-price auction. The volatility of revenue is higher in the uniform-price auctions in all treatments. The results, therefore, provide support for the use of the discriminatory format. Subject characteristics and measures of experience in recent auctions are found to be useful in explaining bidding behavior.