The Output Effects of Government Sponsored Cartels During the New Deal
利用1933年《国家工业复兴法》在美国制造业建立行业范围卡特尔这一历史实验，检验卡特尔对产出的影响，发现其导致制造业产出下降，不支持“有效卡特尔”观点。
This paper uses the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, which set up industry‐wide cartels in the manufacturing sector of the US economy, to gain empirical insight into the current debate on the output effects of cartels. Recent theoretical studies have demonstrated ways in which cartels could expand, rather than reduce output as is traditionally thought. The New Deal cartel experiment does not support this ‘efficient cartel’ view. On the contrary, the legislation brought about a reduction in manufacturing output, as traditional cartel theory would predict.