An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities
提出一种新的动态拍卖机制，用于分配多种异质商品。拍卖人调整价格，竞拍者报告需求量，直至市场出清。该机制允许竞拍者策略性行使市场势力，但仍能实现瓦尔拉斯均衡价格和有效配置。
This article proposes a new dynamic design for auctioning multiple heterogeneous commodities. An auctioneer wishes to allocate K types of commodities among n bidders. The auctioneer announces a vector of current prices, bidders report quantities demanded at these prices, and the auctioneer adjusts the prices. Units are credited to bidders at the current prices as their opponents' demands decline, and the process continues until every commodity market clears. Bidders, rather than being assumed to behave as price-takers, are permitted to strategically exercise their market power. Nevertheless, the proposed auction yields Walrasian equilibrium prices and, as from a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, an efficient allocation.