Scapegoating firm performance: Which CEOs get away with it?
研究CEO离职现象，发现权力大的CEO在业绩差时更可能让管理层成员当替罪羊，自己则免于被解雇。
This article examines research that focused on the phenomenon of chief executive officer (CEO) dismissal and the role of power influence in the dismissal process. The article discusses research conducted by Professor Warren Boeker of Columbia University about executive dismissal in the semiconductor industry. Boeker examined factors that lead to CEO dismissal and succession and discusses various actions that could be taken by a firm regarding management dismissal. The author discusses some of the research findings which indicated that there was a relationship between CEO power, lowered organizational performance and dismissal. The author also notes that in poor performing organizations where the CEO is powerful, members of management are likely to be scapegoat targets.