Endogenous Network Formation in Patent Contests And Its Role as A Barrier to Entry
研究了研发竞争中合作如何影响专利竞赛的战略决策，以及竞赛如何反过来影响企业形成的合作网络结构。发现完全网络并非唯一稳定的，其他稳定网络会导致部分企业退出竞赛，从而弱合作可能成为创新市场的进入壁垒。
In a setting of R & D competition, we study how collaboration affects strategic decisions during a patent contest, and how the latter influences the collaboration network structures the firms can form. We use an all pay auction approach to endogenize both network formation and R & D intensities, and to take heterogeneous and private valuations for patents into account. We find that the complete network is not always the only pairwise stable one. The other stable networks have the realistic property that some firms drop out of the contest. Thus, ‘weak’ cooperation can serve as a barrier to entry on the market for innovation.